(Read Part 1)
The Roberts Commission
The Japanese historian Yoshida Morio was under the impression that the function of the Roberts Commission was merely to deal with the looting of artworks, and with reparations for them. This was not the case. In the May 1945 edition of the Civil Affairs Handbook Japan Section 17A: Cultural Institutions—prepared by the Roberts Commission—we read: “The Shosoin is a unique treasure house—a small log structure built to house the collection of the Emperor Shomu, given to the monastery in the eight century. … Fortunately, Nara is not an industrial area, nor has it been, in the past, a place of military significance. If its buildings and their contents can be spared the whole civilized world will gain immeasurably.” Horyuji and its wooden buildings “would,” the report added, “be an irreparable loss if burned or damaged.” These sections were almost certainly written by Warner.
We have a draft that Warner wrote for the first edition of this book, issued in 1944. This section concerns policies for the occupation of Japan. Under the title “Religious Precincts,” Warner writes: “Americans will be the first to understand that to demonstrate our scorn and ignorance of the Shinto and Buddhist religions or, above all, of the fundamental creed known as ‘Emperor Worship,’ would immediately bolster up and stimulate those beliefs. In fact, the only hope of developing a reconciled and co-operative Japan lies in turning such deep-seated influences into proper channels.” He continued:
Should it become a military necessity to enter any sanctuary, the task in Japan, unlike the similar problem in Europe, must be entrusted to the most responsible officers and to specially picked men, who understand the delicacy of the situation. A surly population, desperate at seeing their holy soil invaded for the first time in history, will be in a mood for suicidal defense of such places as the Imperial Palace Grounds (Gosho) or even of the humblest wayside shrine, when they see a fancied insult.… All Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines and Mausoleums can, from the start, be placed out of bounds for Americans.
To similar effect, Sherman Lee, who worked for MFAA in Japan 1946–8, said, in a 1992 interview: “if you let the occupying troops do what they would, they’d take souvenirs, they’d ruin the temples, the gardens, and so forth. The army, almost immediately when they arrived, placed certain places [i.e. such as these] off limits.”
Niiro Chūnosuke (1869–1954) was a Japanese sculptor responsible for restoring many ancient Buddhist statues in Nara. Warner had studied with him from September 1907 to December 1908, supported by the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and was very close to Niiro’s family. On December 28, 1945, Warner wrote Niiro: “You must not imagine that I was influential in saving Kyoto and Nara. That has always been the policy of the American air force. Many of us worked on lists of important temples and sacred places that were sent to the army and, if I was useful in supplying some of those names, it was owing to your teaching and my studies under you at the Nara temples and the Shosoin.”
Warner arrived in Japan on April 11, 1946. He would have come much earlier but the initial request by Henderson was inadequate in explaining exactly why Warner was needed and was rejected. One major reason for his coming was to get the Japanese to agree to the repatriation of looted books, artworks and cultural properties. The Japanese would understand that Warner had Japan’s best interests at heart. When a second application from Stout was accepted, Warner applied for a passport in the name of Warner Langdon when he should have used the standard naming order—Langdon Warner—leading to a further delay of weeks. In his 1966 book Langdon Warner Through His Letters Theodore Bowie would write: “The upshot is that when Warner arrived in Japan, in 1946, he was received like a hero, much to his embarrassment and annoyance. ‘All of this is the result of Yashiro’s unnecessary announcement,’ he said.”
The Nippon Times of April 21 reported a press conference of Friday 19th. It said: “[Warner] who is credited with dissuading the United States War Department from bombing Kyoto and Nara during the war flatly denied the rumor that the Americans were considering removal of valuable Japanese art objects to the United States.” Warner wrote home at this time: “… every one brings up the old myth (in which I am now a firm believer) that I personally saved Nara and Kyoto from bombing. The formula is to say ‘that was Gov’t. Policy carried out by General MacArthur—no civilian individual was responsible.’ But these people personalize everything.” And MacArthur had, in fact, had nothing to do with the bombing campaigns against Japanese cities which were carried out by the 20th Air Force under Major General LeMay.
George Stout was very impressed with Warner in Japan. In a letter to his wife of April 28, Stout writes: “His obvious distinction, his essential humility, his kindness and his wit, bring him the respect of all he deals with.”
On May 24th Warner and Stout set off by train on a trip to Kansai, first visiting Kyoto. In a press conference given on the morning of the 25th Warner said that Nara and Kyoto being saved from bombing was military policy carried out by General MacArthur. He said it was just a rumor that he personally was responsible. This was reported in the next day’s Kyoto Shimbun. On the 28th the newspaper carried a photo of Warner at Hōryū-ji in Nara looking at a Buddha statue. On the 29th there was a photo of Warner paying a visit to Miss Denton at Doshisha.
Photos of Warner appeared in the Kyoto Shimbun of May 26, 28 and 29. He was called onjin—benefactor. I suspect this is when the Warner myth became fixed.
Who Was Responsible for Saving Kyoto?
In February 1947, Harper’s Magazine published an article by Henry Stimson: “The Decision To Use The Atomic Bomb.” Stimson wrote: “With President Truman’s warm support I struck off the list of suggested targets the city of Kyoto. Although it was a target of considerable military importance, it had been the ancient capital of Japan and was a shrine of Japanese art and culture. We determined that it should be spared.” The Yomiuri Shimbun and the Nippon Times printed accounts of Stimson’s article, so it’s a mystery that it had so little effect on thinking in Japan. Nevertheless, some people were surely aware. The painter Masuda Gyokujō sent a letter with notice of a picture in the mail in thanks to Stimson in 1950. Stimson replied to Masuda: “I have had the pleasure of visiting many cities in Japan, but the city of Kyoto was always my favorite. I knew its beauties, and that it was the center of Japanese art and culture. I, therefore, intervened and prevented the bombing of that city.”
In the process of creating the 1947 article, in December 1946, Stimson learned of a rumor that Kyoto was in fact the first target for the Nagasaki bomb. A December 10, 1946, letter from his successor as Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, reassured him: “The Air Forces understood clearly that under no conditions was Kyoto to be a target for the atomic bomb.”
Otis Cary (1921–2006) of Doshisha University was responsible for refuting the Langdon Warner myth in 1975 for Japanese readers. He wrote articles in both English and Japanese, which were gathered into a pamphlet titled Mr. Stimson’s “Pet City”: The Sparing of Kyoto, 1945 (Doshisha Amherst House, 1975). Shortly after receiving the letter from Stout the two met up in California. We might wonder why Cary didn’t go into more detail on the whole creation of the Warner myth in his writings. One factor may have been that Yashiro died in 1975. It may have seemed unfair so soon after his death to reveal something that some may have felt put him in a bad light. The other protagonist Harold Henderson had passed away just the year before in 1974.
Historian Yoshida Morio (1946–2012) criticized Cary’s arguments. In his book Kyoto ni genbaku wo tōka seyo: Warner densetsu no shinjitsu (1995) Yoshida argued that, in 1945, the Americans deceived the Japanese into thinking Warner had saved Kyoto and Nara. He then argued that, in his 1975 writings, Cary had deceived the Japanese into thinking that Stimson saved Kyoto. But Yoshida’s writings are problematic. For example, he wrongly thought that Warner had visited Japan only twice, and he never even mentions the fact that Stimson had visited Kyoto. He argues that a third atomic bomb would have targeted Kyoto. It’s true that more bombs were being created but targets had not been decided and it’s hard to see how Stimson’s objections could be overridden. I have previously written about Stimson’s visit to Kyoto. This year will be the 100th anniversary of his visit on October 2–3, 1926.
In the postwar period Warner would have liked to visit Japan. However, the U.S. Army was not enthusiastic about this. In a letter of May 5, 1948, to J.M. Plumer held at the Houghton Library, Harvard University, Warner explained he was unlikely to be able to visit: “So far my one reaction, obtained from a member of the State Department, took it for granted that I should be working at cross-purposes to SCAP , trying to cover up treasure demanded for reparations and helping the collectors of objects d’art escape taxation by their own government.”
In August of 1952 Warner managed to make a final visit back to Japan serving on the American Committee of Selection for the “Exhibition of Japanese Painting and Sculpture” of 1953. He wasn’t in good health and struggled in the “oven-like heat and dripping humidity.” Yashiro Yukio was on the Japanese side and the two men had mended their strained relations. After very difficult negotiations the Japanese agreed to an incredibly strong list of works to travel to five U.S. Museums in 1953. Professor Shimura Shōko wrote that 69 of the total 91 works were national treasures or important cultural properties. Originally some of the Japanese were upset that the Americans appeared to be demanding such a strong list. All was smoothed over and Warner’s presence was an important factor. Alan Priest of the Metropolitan Museum of Art would write: “As committee members both we and the Japanese take every advantage of the myth that Langdon is the Saviour of Kyoto and then the Saviour of Kyoto and Nara. This has been handled very well. He has protested and denied it—got weary of Mayors and flashlights—it has been useful to us.” It also helped that Warner was friends with the Japanese premier Yoshida who invited him to lunch.
All in all though, the visit back was an unpleasant experience for Warner. He wrote “I had to spend hours of strain being polite and grateful in a foreign language. They came at all hours and were of all classes and I left with a bad taste at having to refuse an old lady from the far North even unwrap her bundle on the steps as we got into our car for the plane. She said it contained a small bronze Buddha of the 7th century. She was poor and a widow and no doubt felt sure I would buy.”
The exhibition of 1953, however, was a great success and showed the ability of art to nurture goodwill between peoples. 25,000 people crowded the first day of the exhibition on January 25 at the National Gallery of Art in Washington. Both countries were trying to move on from the horrors that had been. The myth of Langdon Warner saving Kyoto and Nara was one factor which helped many Japanese move on.